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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF U'TAH 
In the Interest of 
KARL BAILEY 
Alleged dependent and 
neglected child. 
Civil No. 872'2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CHILDREN'S SERVICE SOCIETY OF UITAH 
STATEMENT OF F AC;TS 
We do not agree with appellant's statement of 
facts. 
On the lOth day of June, 1957, the Juvenile 
Court of the Second Juvenile District in and for 
Salt L·ake County, State of Utah, after extensive 
hearings held on May 14, 16 and 24, 1957, (R. 1-2) 
found the minor child, Karl Bailey, born out of 
wedlock on January 7, 1955, to Margar~t Susan 
Willis, now Sharp, and J. Gordon Bailey (Ex. 7, 
R. 221-222), to be a neglected child and the child's 
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natural father, J. Gordon B·ailey, to be an unfit and 
improper person to have the care, custody and con-
trol of the child (R. 22-24). The court entered a 
decree and judgment by which it terminated all 
parental rights of Bailey as natural father of the 
child and granted custody of the child to the Chil-
dren's Service Society of Utah with authorization 
to place the child for adoption (R. 25). 
The natqral mother, Margaret Susan Willis 
Sharp, hereinafter referred to as Susan, had there-
tofore on January 16, 1957, executed in the juvenile 
court a permanent relinquishment of her parental 
rights in the child and authorized placement of the 
child for adoption ( R. 8) . The juvenile court had 
on January 16, 1957, found the child to be an ille-
gitimate and neglected child and entered a decree 
permanently depriving Susan of custody of the child 
and granting custody of the child to the Children's 
Service Society of Utah with right of adoption 
placement ( R. 9) . 
From the judgment and decree entered by the 
juvenile court on the lOth day of June, 1957, find-
ing the child to be a neglected child and the natural 
father, J. Gordon Bailey, to be an unfit and im-
proper person to have its custody and control and 
granting custody to the Children's Service Society 
of Utah with authorization to place the child for 
adop'tion, J. Gordon Bailey appeals (R. 27). 
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S·TATEMENT OF POIN:TIS 
POINT I. 
TIRE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE AND AD-
MIT'TED F AC'TS CONCLUSIVELY SHOW THE CHILD 
TO BE A NEGLEC'TED CHILD AND APPELLANT 'TO 
BE AN UNFIT AND IMPROPER PERSON TO HAVE 
ITS CUS'TODY WITHIN THE MEANING OF SEC'TIONS 
55-10-6 AND 55-10-32, U.C .. A., 1953. 
POIN'T II. 
'THE ORDER PERMANENTLY DEPRIVING AP-
PELLANT OF CU8TODY OF 'THE C1HILD AND AUTH-
ORIZING PLACEMENT OF 'THE CHILD FOR ADOP-
TION IS SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS. 'THE 
JUVENILE COUR'T FOUND ·THE CHILD TO BE A 
NEGLEC'TED C'HILD WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
SEC'TIONS 55-10-6 AND 55-10-32, U.C.A., 19'53, AND 
TH~T 'THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD REQUIRED 
THAT HIS CUSTODY BE TAKEN FROM APPELLAN'T. 
POIN'T III. 
THE JUVENILE COURT FOUND THE CHILD TO 
BE THE LEGITIM~TE CHILD OF APPELLANT BY 
VIRTUE OF PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGMEN·T PURSU-
ANT 'TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTI'ON 78-30-12, 
U.C.A., 1953. 
POINT IV. 
THE :JUVENILE COUR'T DID NOT ERR IN AD-
MITTING EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE PROSPEC-
TIVE ADOP'TING PARENTS IN ITHE IN'TERES'T OF 
THE CHILD. 
STATEMEN'T OF EVIDEN!CE 
The evidence and proceedings before the juven-
ile court on the hearing for the determination of 
Bailey's rights in the child were as follows. 
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Bailey was 'born on December 9, 1921. He was 
thirty-five years of age at the time of the hearing. 
(R. 211.) He served in the United States Army as 
a private for approximately three years from June 
of 194'3 'to January of 1946 (R. 214, 245). There-
after he studied art on the G. I. Bill intermittently 
for approximately two and one-half years (R. 245). 
Bailey married a Mrs. Martha Bander Singer 
in Mexico City, Mexico, on November 19, 1951. 
Mrs. Singer was divorced from her previous hus-
band. (R. 92-97, Ex. 1.) Mrs. Singer had a fifteen 
year old son from her prior marriage ( R. 99, 293). 
Bailey testified that he lived with her approximately 
eight months ( R. 9'2) . 'They came to the United 
States ( R. 293). Mrs. Singer separated from Bailey 
and returned to Mexico under the following circum-
stan·ces. Bailey did not support her in the manner in 
which she was accustomed (R. 99, 293). When she 
came to the United States, she had a substantial 
amount of money. When she separated from Bailey, 
she had to work to obtain the money for her and 
her son to return to Mexico. (R. 293.) The son by 
the prior marriage could not adjust to Bailey (R. 
293-294). Thereafter, unbeknown to Bailey, Mrs. 
Singer procured a legal termi11ation of her marriage 
to Bailey in a Mexican court on April 5, 1952, -(R. 
93-97, Ex. 1). Bailey did not know that the marriage 
had been legally terminated until a ye·ar and one-
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half later, sometime after January 4, 1954, when 
he received a certified copy of the decree of the 
Mexican court terminating the marriage, which cer-
tificate was dated January 4, 1954, (R. 93-97, 101, 
251~252, 279-280). The decree of the Mexican court 
received in evidence was written in Spanish and 
translated 'by a Mexican interpreter who testified 
that he was not familiar with Mexican law and did 
not know whether the document constituted, under 
Mexican law, a decree of divorce or of nullification 
of the marriage ( R. 97-98) . 
Margaret Susan Willis, now Sharp, the mother 
of the child, Karl Bailey, was born in Canada and 
raised in England (R. 275). She attended the Uni-
versity of London as a student ( R. 320-321). While 
she was there, she conceived a child out of wedlock 
under unfortunate circumstances from a professor 
at the university (R. 275). After conception of the 
child, her family carne to the United States in Nov-
em'ber of 1951. 'They resided first at Provo, Utah, 
and thereafter in Salt Lake City. Susan gave birth 
to that child and placed it for adoption in Denver, 
Colorado, with a Red Feather Agency. (R. 32, 275.) 
'Thereafter Susan met Bailey at an· artist's 
banquet in Salt Lake City in December of 1952 (R. 
276). A month later Bailey called on Susan, took 
her to his mother's home to have dinner with his 
mother, then told her that he wanted to show her 
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some paintings in another room, took her into his 
bedroom and kept her there all night. Bailey had 
illicit sexual intercourse with Susan on that occa-
sion. The following morning they had breakfast 
with Bailey's mother at the mother's home. (R. 276-
277.) The following weekend Susan visited Bai'ley 
at Logan, where Bailey was attending school on the 
G. I. Bill. Bailey had illicit sexual intercourse with 
Susan on that occasion. ( R. 227-228.) 
Susan at the time was having difficulty with 
her parents. ·She told Bailey that she would like to 
live with him. Bailey immediately accepted the pro-
posal. Bailey told Susan that he was then married to 
Martha Bander Singer, but that as soon as the pre-
vious marriage was legally terminated he would 
marry Susan. Thereafter in February of 1953 Susan 
went to live with Bailey at Logan, Utah, in what, 
so far as Bailey knew, was an illegal and adulterous 
relationship. (R. 278-279.) Bailey admitted on the 
witness stand that he did not receive notice of ter-
mination of his prior marriage to Martha Bander 
Singer until some twelve months after he comn1enc-
ed living with ·susan, when he received the certified 
copy of the decree of the Mexican court dated J anu-
ary 4, 1954, (R. 97, 101, 251-252, Ex. 1). Susan's 
parents, Mr. and Mrs. David R. Willis, knew Susan 
was with Bailey. They thought she was married to 
him. (R. 33~34, 180-183, 40-41, 337-338.) Upon 
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receipt in 19'54 of notice of termination of the prior 
marriage, Susan requested that Bailey marry her. 
Bailey replied that it was entirely unnecessary, that 
marriage was an unimportant function and that 
people should be free of the institution of marriage 
so they could come and go promiscuously according 
to their desires. He therefore refused to marry 
Susan. (R. 27'9-280.) Susan's testimony to this effect 
was corroborated by her father ( R. 180-183), her 
mother (R. 40-41, 337-338), her sister (R. 75-76), 
and her brother..:in-law ( R. 50). 
Susan and Bailey lived in Logan for two or 
three months until April of 1953. Bailey was a stu-
dent on the G. I. Bill. ( R. 280.) Thereafter from 
April of 1953 to June of 1954 they 1ived a vagrant 
and itinerant life, in Salt Lake City for three weeks; 
in Santa Fe, New Mexico, for four and one-half 
months; back in Salt Lake City for three weeks ; 
in Santa Rosa, California, for three months; and, 
in ·san Francisco, California, for six months. Dur-
ing the entire thirteen month period Bailey was a 
student on the G. I. Bill for approximately two and 
one-half months while they were in Santa Fe. ·Other-
wise he was unemployed and did nothing. Due to 
their destitute circumstances Susan obtained em-
ployment as an operating room assistant in a hos-
pital in Santa Fe and as an office clerk in San Fran-
cisco. She supported both herself and Bailey through-
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out the period. While they were in Santa Rosa, Susan 
conceived a child and requested that Bailey procure 
medical assistance. Bailey stated that it was un-
necessary and refused. Thereafter Susan had a mis-
carriage. Following the miscarriage Susan hem-
orrhaged for ·approximately six weeks. She requested 
medical attention, but Bailey refused. (R. 281-288, 
36, 261-262.) 
Susan and Bailey left San Francisco in May 
of 1954 and returned to Salt Lake City in June of 
1954. They stayed with Bailey's mother for approx-
imately five weeks until Mrs. Bailey forced them 
to leave. Thereafter they stayed with Susan's parents 
in Salt Lake City for approximately three weeks. 
( R. 289-290.) In the meantime Susan had conceived 
the child, Karl, who is the subject of this proceeding, 
in April of 1954 (R. 290). Susan requested medical 
care. They had no money and could not afford it. 
Bailey refused to provide medical care for Susan 
and the child during the period of conception and 
birth on the following g·rounds: that medical care 
during child birth is unnecessary; that animals have 
their young without medical attention; that he dis-
trusted the medical profession because doctors in-
tentionally infect women with cancer in order to 
increase their business incon1e; and, that the latter 
is the reason so few women are able to nurse their 
children. (R. 290-291.) Bailey admitted on the wit-
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ness stand that he provided no medical care, was 
evasive as to his reasons and explained that "if you 
have faith you can move mountains" (R. 263-2617). 
Susan and Bailey were destitute at the time they 
were in Salt Lake City in June and July of 1954. 
Susan was ill and pregnant with the child, Karl. 
Susan, because of their destitute circumstances, at 
that time procured a job as a night waitress in an 
A & W Root Beer stand in Salt Lake City. Bailey 
was unemployed and did nothing. (R. 34-35, 289, 
291.) Susan at the time was disturbed about her 
physical condition, the fact that she could not con-
tinue her employment and the coming birth of the 
child. She asked Bailey what his intentions were. 
Bailey proposed that they travel in a truck, pick up 
odd farm jobs along the way, and that the child 
could be born in the truck. (R. 291.) 
Mter conception of the child, Karl, :Susan plead-
ed with Bailey to marry her so that the child would 
not be illegitimate. Bailey refused stating that it 
was unnecessary because no child is, "illegitimate 
before ·God". ( R. 29'2.) 
In August or Septemlber of 1954 Susan and 
Bailey procured a job as caretakers at the Burnham 
Duck Club, at Bountiful, Utah, ( R. 292, 1298). 'The 
child was born at the duck club on January 7, 19'55, 
(R. 221-222, 298-299). !They remained there for 
approxim·a:tely ten months thereafter, until October 
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30, 1955, when Susan terminated the illicit relation-
S'hip with Bailey and left with the child, Karl, under 
the circums~tances hereinafter set forth (R. 309-
312). Bailey is still employed as caretaker at the 
duck club. He works :three months a year during the 
duck season from October through December. Other-
wise he is unemployed. His total cash income is 
$800.00 per year. Quarters at the duck club are 
furnished to the caretaker free of charge. (R. 240-
241, 63-67.) The home in which Susan and Bailey 
and the child, after its birth, lived at the duck club 
is a sma1l unpainted housE, poorly insulated, exposed 
to the outside elements, with meager furnishings, no 
wallpaper and insects all over the area (R. 37, 
63-64). 
T'he following evidence in the r e c o r d as to 
Bailey's homosexual and sodomous relationships 
and general sexual depravity is uncontroverted. 
Susan's testimony as to the facts is corroborated by 
the testimony of her sister (R. 75-76), brother-in-
law (Ro 50-51), and her own mother (R. 41-43). 
During the time that Bailey was 'living with 
his first wife, Martha Bander Singer, Mrs. Singer's 
fifteen year old son 'by a prior marriage lived with 
them. Bailey insisted, over the boy's o·bjection, in 
having sexual intercourse with the boy's mother in 
the boy's presence. Bailey told the mother that the 
boy had an overdeveloped affection for her, which 
10 
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Bailey called an "Oedipus Complex". Bailey told 
the mother that she should have sexual intercourse 
with the boy, her own son, in order to cure this. IThe 
mother and son could not adjust to Bailey. As a 
result they separated. ( R. 293-294.) 
During the period that Bailey was living with 
Susan he habitually, over her objection, by the use 
of physical force made her submit to sexual inter-
course 'by use of the mouth (R. 294-295). During the 
period that {Susan and Bailey were staying with 
Bailey's sister, Josephine Booth Elliott, in ·san Fran-
cisco, Bailey engaged in masturbation with his 
sister's thirteen year old daughter and boasted about 
it (R. 295). While Susan and Bailey were living 
at the duck club Bailey indulged in masturbation 
with Susan's twelve year old brother. Susan sent 
the brother home. (R. 295-296.) Susan's mother, 
Mrs. David R. Willis, required that her children 
keep the doors of the Willis home locked and specifi-
cally instructed them not to let Bailey in her home 
because of his sexual depravity (R. 42-43). Bailey 
persistently committed sexual indiscretions upon 
Susan's married sister and Susan's seven year old 
sister (R. 296, 41-43, 50-51, '76). Bailey on more 
than one occasion suggested, that in order to provide 
· f h · d S S ~ec.am~ • rl·R-1'4· Income or 1m an us.an, usan ueeame a prosti-
tute and he would act as the panderer and get the 
business (R. 297). Susan at one time discussed with 
11 
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Bailey having one of her friends from the University 
of London come to live with them. Bailey suggested 
that she do so so that the 'three of them could have 
sexual relations as a trio. ( R. 298.) Bailey indulged 
in masturbation of the infant, Karl, who is t]le sub-
ject of this proceeding, while the child was living 
with him to a point where he caused sexual stimulus 
in the infant and then boasted of having done so 
( R. 309). All of the above evidence is positive, direct 
and uncontroverted. Bailey did not deny it. 
Bailey openly rejected marriage as an institu-
tion expressly on the ground that people should be 
permitted to freely indulge in promiscuity whenever 
and with whomever they desire (R. 50, 75-76, 296-
297). Bailey rejected religious institutions and 
churches on the ground that they are purely man 
made. B·ailey does not attend any chureh. (R. 297, 
249-2500) 
The child, K·arl; was to be born in January of 
1955. Susan requested medical care and hospitaliza-
tion for herself and the child when she expected it 
to arrive. Bailey refused and stated that it was un-
necessary. ( R. 298.) Susan requested baby clothing 
in preparation for the coming child. Bailey stated 
that there was no point in buying things for some-
thing that did not exist. Therefore, Susan surrepti-
tiously ·held out money that she acquired from clean-
ing ducks for members of the duck club, bought 
12 
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clothing for the child and hid it from Bailey. (R. 
298-299.) Just prior to birth of the child Susan 
suggested that they sterilize the things with which 
the child would come in contact. Bailey replied that 
sterilization was unnecessary because, if people (in 
this case the child that is the subject of this pro-
ceeding) are not strong enough to deal with germs, 
they should die. (R. 299.) 
The child was born at the duck club with only 
Susan and Bailey present (R. 221-222, 263, 299-
300). Susan was in labor from 5:00 a.m. to 11 :00 
a.m. Bailey became impatient. (R. 299.) Susan had 
sterilized some handkerchiefs and a pair of scissors 
for the purpose of severing the umbilical cord. When 
the child was born, Susan asked Bailey to unwrap 
the scissors from the handkerchief and hand them 
to her. Bailey, because of his impatience, picked up 
an unsterile pair of scissors and used that for the 
purpose of severing the umbi~ical cord. Susan asked 
Bailey to hand ·her the sterile handkerchiefs for the 
purpose of cleaning the baby. Bailey refused, pulled 
an unclean handkerchief out of his pocket and wiped 
the baby with it. (R. 299-300.) Mter birth of the 
child 'Susan asked Bailey to hand her the baby cloth-
ing that she had surreptitiously purchased and hid-
den in a chest of drawers because she was too weak 
to get the clothing herself. Bailey refused, stated 
that it was unnecessary, and that she should keep 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the child warm as animals do with her body. ;Susan 
did just that because she was too weak to do other-
wise. ( R. 300-302.) 
Susan requested silver nitrate for the child's 
eyes and explained to Bailey that the state law re-
quires that silver nitrate be administered at birth 
in order to prevent blindness. Bailey refused and 
gave his reason that the administration of silver 
nitrate causes weakness in children's eyes and is 
responsible for so many children having to wear 
glasses. As a result no silver nitrate was administer-
ed to the child at birth. ( R. 302-303.) 
There was no respirator present at the birth 
of the child to remove the mucus from his nose and 
lungs. As a result the child suffered from prolonged 
respiratory difficulty and stopped breathing. Susan 
requested medical help. Bailey refused and gave as 
his reason that animals or organs that are born im-
perfect should be left to die if they are going to die 
and that the fault of the medical profession is that 
they keep alive imperfect human beings and that is 
why there is so much illness in the world. (R. 304-
305.) 
'There was no erg·otrate present at birth of the 
child for the purpose of contracting the mother's 
uterus ( R. 303). After birth of the child, Bailey 
kept the placenta in the house for three days and 
told Susan that she n1ust eat it, as animals do, in 
14 
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order to restore hormones to her body that had been 
lost during the birth. (R. 303-304.) 
Mter birth of the child it suffered from a jaun-
dice condition over a long period of time. Susan re-
quested medical help 'because she was concerned over 
the possibility that this condition would cause brain 
damage to the child. Bailey, with knowledge that 
prolonged periods of jaundice may cause brain dam-
age in infants, refused medical care. ( R. 305-306.) 
·The baby suffered from chronic diarrhea for a 
period of two months with intermittent fevers. Susan 
requested medical help. Bailey replied that she could 
get medical care if she could get one of the doctors 
who was a member of the duck club to administer it 
so that he would not have to pay for the care. Susan 
attempted to contact three doctors. 'The first two 
were out of town. Bailey refused to permit her to 
conta~t the third doctor. Susan again attempted to 
contact a doctor, and Bailey told her to seek medical 
advice through her sister, who was using a doctor, 
so th·at he, Bailey, would not have to pay for it. (R. 
306-307.) 
Bailey refused to provide vaccination and im-
munization for the child. He explained that disease 
is to be either survived, or not, without medical care. 
(R. 308.) 
Bailey refused to provide cod-liver oil and vita-
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min supplements for the child as a therapeutic mea-
sure. Susan's family provided them. (R. 308.) 
Susan's testimony as to Bailey's wilful failure 
to provide the child with medical care and his inten-
tional exposure of the child to the dangers inherent 
in such neglect is corroborated by the testimony of 
Susan's mother (R. 38-40, 39-43), sister (R. 72-75), 
and brother-in-law (R. 45-46, 49). That this con-
duct illegally and dangerously exposed the child to 
illness and death, see the expert testimony of Mrs. 
David R. Willis (R. 339-343), who has been a regis-
tered nurse in both England and the United States 
for over thirty years ( R. 43). 
After birth of the child Susan again asked 
B·ailey to marry her in order to legitimate the child. 
Bailey refused and stated that it was unnecessary. 
(R. 305). 
After birth of the child, due to the destitute 
circumstances, Susan begged for old rags, made rag 
rugs from them and exchanged the rugs for used 
clothing for herself. I-Ier family provided the cloth-
ing for the child. ( R. 307-308.) 
Between January of 1955 a11d October of 1955 
Bailey was unemployed. He did not work and re-
mained arou11d the house all the time. During the 
period he became physically violent, beat Susan with 
his fists, kicked her and physically abused the child 
during periods of impatience to ·a point where ·susan 
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became afraid and did not leave the child alone with 
him. (R. 308-309.) Susan's testimony as to Bailey's 
physical abuse of the child was corroborated by her 
sister (R. 74). 
Bailey had a friend named Jesse Sharp, whom 
Bailey had known for ten years ( R. 223) . 
'·On Saturday, apparently October 2·2, 1955, 
Sharp came to visit B·ailey and stayed at the duck 
club with Bailey and Susan through Tuesday or 
Wednesday, October 25 or October 26, 1955. The 
day after Sharp left Susan commented to Bailey that 
she had enjoyed Sharp's visit. Bailey then suggested 
that, if Susan wanted to lbe with Sharp, she should 
go and live with him. Susan was surprised and 
taken back because she thought her relationship with 
Bailey was permanent. Sharp was planning to leave 
for Cuba. On Saturday, October 29, 19'55, Susan met 
Sharp in town. Sharp asked Susan if she were mar-
ried to Bailey. Sharp then informed Susan that 
Bailey had stated that his principal objective was, 
on the first opportunity, to dump Susan and the 
baby because he, Bailey, was tired of the respon-
sibility. Sharp then asked Susan to marry him and 
suggested that she leave Bailey, go live with her 
parents, and, when Sharp returned from his trip 
to Cuba, they would be married. (R. 309-31'2.) 
'Susan and Sharp then returned to the duck 
club and told Bailey that they planned to be married. 
17 
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Bailey specifically suggested that they take the 
child, Karl, with them and asked them a'bout their 
plans. They told Bailey of the plan for Susan to live 
wi;th her parents for about three months and then 
get married. Bailey suggested that there was noth-
ing to prevent them from leaving at that time and 
getting married immediately. T·hereafter Bailey 
loaned 'Susan and Sharp his suitcase for the purpose 
of travelling and took them and the child to the bus 
station in Salt Lake City so that the three of them 
could depart. Susan and S·harp left with the child 
the following day and went to Sacramento, Calif-
ornia. They were married in Reno, Nevada, on the 
way. ( R. 313-314.) 
Susan and S·harp had told Bailey that they were 
going to Sacramento at the time of their departure. 
Ten days later, after they arrived in Sacramento, 
they informed Bailey by letter dated November 9, 
19'55, and told him that he could reach them by ad-
dressing them care of General Delivery in Sacra-
mento. (Ex. 8, R. 231-232, 314.) They stayed in 
Sacramento about a month and then went to San 
Francis-co. Sharp had difficulty adjusting to the 
child, Karl, so Susan returned to her family in Salt 
Lake City two weeks later for the purpose of getting 
them to care for the child for a short time while 
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In the meantime by letter, dated November. 9, 
1955, Susan informed her parents, Mr. and Mrs. 
Willis, for the first time that she was not married 
to Bailey because, at first, Bailey stated that he had 
a prior marriage that had not been terminated and, 
later, because after termination of the prior marri-
age, Bailey refused to marry her (R. 180-183, 315-
316, 337-338). Mrs. Willis confronted Bailey with 
the contents of the letter. Bailey did not deny it. 
(R. 337-338.) At the same time Mr. Willis learned 
tha:t Bailey had actively assisted Susan and Sharp in 
departing and that Bailey knew of th~ir where-
abouts after their departure ( R. 178). 
Susan returned to the home of 'her parents in 
Salt Lake City in December of 1955. Bailey met 
'Susan there. Susan in front of her parents confront-
ed Bailey with the fact that he had not maintained 
her, that he had never worked during the time that 
she had known him and that, although she had asked 
him to marry her on many occasions, he had persis-
tently refused to do so. Bailey did not deny the accu-
sations. ;See the testimony of Susan ( R. 316-317) , 
Mr. Willis (R. 182-183), and Mrs. Willis (R. 837-
338). 
In the middle of January of 1956, Susan and 
the child left the Willis home and moved into an 
apartment preparatory to the return of Sharp from 
Californ'ia (R. 316-317). 'Thereafter Bailey wrote 
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a letter to Susan and Sharp and requested of Susan 
a reconciliation even though Bailey knew that in the 
meantime Susan had married Sharp. Sharp replied 
by letter postmarked February 2, 1956, (Ex. 11) 
and told Bailey to quit bothering them. (R. 2'36-
238.) Bailey testified that, after receipt of this 
letter from Sharp, he did not make any further in-
quiries concerning, or attempts to learn of the where-
abouts of, the child Karl ( R. 240). 
The record shows conclusively that during the 
period from October 29, 19'55, when Susan and the 
child left with Sharp down to February of 1956, 
Bailey knew the whereabouts of Susan and the child 
or facts from which he could have ascertained their 
whereabouts. He did not at any time during the 
period contribute to the support of the child. (R. 
316-317.) Bailey told Sharp's sister that he con-
sented that Susan leave with Sharp because Sharp 
was in a better position to care for the child than 
Bailey (R. 168-169). Bailey told Mrs. Alice Olson, 
case worker for the Children's Service Society of 
Utah, in a conversation three weeks prior to the 
date of the 'hearing in this matter that he had not 
contributed to the support of the child because he 
knew Sharp had $800.00 at the time Susan and the 
iit 
child left, was employed, and was able to care for 
the child ( R. 57-58). The record shows conclusively 
that from the time of receipt of the letter from 
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Sharp, postmarked February 2, 1956, telling Bailey 
to quit bothering them down to the time of the hear~ 
ing in this matter, Bailey made no further inquiries 
concerning the child, or attempts to learn of its 
whereabouts, and that he did not support it ( R. 
57-58, 168-169, 240, 317). 
On February 9, 1956, Susan placed the child in 
the care of the Children's Service Society of Utah 
on a temporary basis pending adjustment of her 
marriage with S·harp (R. 55, 85, 318). She was 
prompted to do so because Sharp could not adjust 
to the child, Karl, they were not getting along, she 
was desperate and felt that it was necessary in the 
child's best interest (R. 318). At the time of the 
placement Susan 'informed the Children's Service 
Society that the child was born of a previous illicit 
relationship ( R. 85) . She misrepresented both the 
date of birth and the identity of the natural father, 
J. Gordon Bailey. S'he did so because she was afraid 
of Bailey and expressed concern to the representa-
tives of the Children's Service Society over any pos-
sibility that the child would come in contact with, 
or un·der the influence of, its father because of the 
father's sexual depravity. (R. 55-56, 69-70, 347-
349.) The Children's 'Service Society at the time of 
the placement in February of 1956 made an investi-
gation of the record~ of the Bureau of Vital Statis-
tics of the State Health Department to ·ascertain 
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the correct birth date of the child and the identity 
of the father, but was unable to obtain the informa-
tion be.cause Susan had misrepresented both the birth 
date and the father's identity. (R. 69-70). 
At the time of the placement the ehild was suf .. 
fering from a severe allergy and respiratory infec-
tion. The Children's Service Society immediately 
place·d the child in the care of Dr. Fis·hler, pediatri-
cian for the society. 'The child, then over one year 
old, received his first medical care. (R. 56-57, 78-
79.) 
Thereafter Susan went with Sharp to Calif-
ornia. She did not contact the Children's Service 
Society again, except for two short telephone con-
versations, until some ten months later on November 
21, 1956. (R. 58.) In the meantime the Children's 
Service Society placed the child with excellent foster 
home parents ( R. 327-330, 349-350). On November 
21, 1956, Susan came to the Children's Service So-
ciety and had a conference with Mrs. Virginia Lee 
Bennett and Mrs. Alice Olson, executive secretary 
and case worker respectively, for the society. In the 
conference she explained th·at her husband, Sharp, 
from whom she had in the meantime had another 
child, could not despite her efforts adjust to the 
child, Karl, and that for that reason she did not 
want the child. ( R. 58.) 
Thereafter on December 7, 1956, proceedings 
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were con1menced in the Juvenile Court of Salt Lake 
County for the purpose of terminating Susan's par-
ental rights and procuring authorization to place 
the child, Karl, for adoption ( R. 4-5, 58). A hearing 
was held in the matter on December 10, 1956, (R. 
5, 58-59, 87-88). Susan appeared at the hearing 
and testified that the child was born out of wedlock 
and, for the first time, disclosed the true birth date 
of the child, January 7, 1955, and the identity of 
the natural father, J. Gordon Bailey, (R. 6, 59, 87-
88) . Susan at the hearing stated that she desired an 
opportunity to adjust her affairs and to determine 
whether or not she could possibly provide care for 
the child and requested that the court give her a 
little time in which to determine whether or not 
she could do so ( R. 6, 30). The court, therefore, 
found the child to be a neglected child and ordered 
the case continued to January 16, 19'57, (R. 6-7, 
30). Susan appeared in the juvenile court on J anu-
ary 16, 1957, and executed a voluntary relinquish-
ment of her parental rights in the child, advised the 
court that the child was born out of wedlock and ille-
gitimate, and consented to placement of the child 
for adoption ( R. 8, 30). The court thereupon entered 
a decree by which it adjudicated the child to be the 
illegitimate child of Susan, terminated :Susan's par-
ental rights, and granted custody of the child to the 
C·hildren's Service Society of Utalh with authoriza-
tion to place the child for ·adoption ( R. 9, 30). 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Three days later on January 19. 1957, the 
Children's Service Society was advised 'by its coun-
sel that, in view of the fact that Bailey had lived 
with Susan and the child at the duck club for some 
time after its birth and in view of the provisions of 
Section 78-30-12, U.C.A., 1953, pertaining to legi-
timation of children by public acknowledgment, pro-
ceedings should 'be commenced against Bailey in the 
juvenile court for the purpose of determining Bail-
ey's rights, if any, in the child and for the purpose 
of terminating any parental rights that Bailey might 
have in the child on grounds of neglect (R. 59, 88). 
Bailey at tha:t time was in California and was not 
due to return to the duck club at Bountiful, Utah, 
until sometime in March of 1957 (R. 59, 88). Bailey 
it will be recalled had last been in contact with Susan 
and the child a year before in February of 1956 (R. 
236-238). In the interval B·ailey ·had made no in-
quiries concerning the wefare of the child, had not 
attempted to determine its whereabouts and had 
not supported it (R. 68, 240, 316-317). 
Bailey in the meantime had met a Mrs. Lee 
Deffebach Hanson sometin1e in May of 1956 (R. 
195). About a month and ·a half later, sometime in 
July or August of 1956, Bailey and Lee Deffebach 
commenced living openly in an illicit and adulterous 
relationship at the Burnham Duck Club at Bounti-
ful, Uta'h, (R. 104-106, 196, 206). Lee Deffebach 
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had met her husband, Glade Ballard Hanson, appar-
ently sometime in 1955. One month later she married 
him. Thereafter she and Hanson went to Europe 
where Lee Deffebach Hanson was an art student 
on a Fulbright scholarship. They separated in Eur-
ope, and Hanson returned to the United States. (R. 
190-191.) Thereafter 'Lee Deffebach Hanson return-
ed to New York City where she was a charity patient 
for sometime in a New York hospital (R. 192, 208). 
Thereafter Mrs. Hanson returned to Salt Lake City 
in May of 1956. She met J. Gordon Bailey at that 
time. (R. 195.) Approximately one month later 
Glade Ballard Hanson sued Mrs. Hanson for, and 
was awarded an, interlocutory decree of divorce on 
June 12, 1956. Mrs. Hanson did not contest the pro-
ceedings. (R. 106, 191.) She explained that the 
reason her marriage to Hanson was not successful 
was because Hanson was homosexual (R. 192). She 
testified, as did Susan in Susan's case (R. 278), 
that she entered into the adulterous relationship with 
Balley because, on her returning home and getting 
the divorce, she was having difficulty with her 
parents (R. 196). Bailey admitted on the witness 
stand that he lived with Susan in what so far as he 
knew was an adulterous relationship from 1953 to 
1954 (R. 251-252) and in an illicit relationship 
from 1954 through October of 1955, and that there-
after he lived with Lee Deffebach in an adulterou·s 
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relationship from July or August of 1956 through 
December of 1956 (R. 251-255). Bailey was a man 
thirty-five years of age at the time of the hear-
ing (R. 211). His explanation was that he lived with 
both women in adulterous and illicit relationships, 
over his own objection, but that he finally gave in 
and lived with Susan because of her insistance and 
with L~e Deffe'bach because "he considered it very 
important to her health" that he do so. (R. 251-255.) 
Lee Deffebach's divorce from Hanson became 
final on December 12, 1956, (R. 106, 191). She 
and Bailey were married on December 14, 1956, 
(R. 197). 
Mrs. Virginia Lee Bennett had known Lee 
Deffebach since 1945 as a childhood acquaintance 
of one of the wards of the Children's Service Society 
(R. 201-202). Mrs. Bennett knew that Lee Deffe-
bach was staying at a place known as the Burnham 
Duck Club in the summer of 1956 because Mrs. 
Bennett contacted her there by telephone ( R. 80). 
Mrs. Bennett did not know at the time that Lee 
Deffebach was living in an adulterous relationship 
with J. G~rdon Bailey (R. 78-91), and Mrs. Bennett 
did not know that J. Gordon Bailey was the father 
of the ,child, Karl, until after the hearing in the 
juvenile court on December 10, 1956~ when Susan 
disclosed the fact (R. 84-87). On December 13 or 
14, 1956, Mrs. Bennett received an announcement 
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that Lee Deffebach and Bailey were married. On 
December 27 or 28, 1956, Lee Deffebach informed 
Mrs. Bennett that she and Bailey were leaving for 
California and that they would not return for two 
or three months. (R. 81.) On January 19, 1957, 
after Susan's parental rights in the child had been 
terminated, the Children's Service Society of Utah 
was advised by its counsel that a hearing should be 
held for the purpose of terminating any rights that 
Bailey migh·t have in the child on grounds of neglect 
(R. 59, 88). 
Bailey returned from California in March of 
1957 (R. 59, 88). In April of 1957, the Children's 
Service Society contacted Bailey for the purpose of 
procuring a release of any rights that he might have 
in the child and his consent to its adoption (R. 5'9-60, 
88). Thereafter Bailey had a conversation with Mrs. 
Virginia Lee Bennett and Mrs. Alice Olson at the 
Children's Service Society on April 22, 19'57, and a 
subsequent conversation with Mrs. Olson on May 7, 
1'957, (R. 60, 64-65). 
In the conversations Bailey expressed open ap-R.A·t't' 
proval of his illicit relationship with Susan (R. 
60-61, 82). He stated that he learned about human 
beings from his observations of, and his deductions 
from, the actions of animals particularly cattle. He 
explained 'Susan's difficulties in the following lan-
guage. That Susan was like a cow that has been de-
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prived of a calf. That such a cow, which he called 
a "leppy", becomes very promiscuous and will not 
take care of its young. That Susan's parents had 
forced her to give up her first child conceived in 
England. That as a result Susan had become very 
promiscuous and in consequence thereof had lived in 
a promiscuous relationship with him, Bailey, and 
thereafter left Bailey to be with Sharp. (R. 60-61, 
8'2.) 
From 1943 to 1957 Bailey has engaged in no 
steady gainful employment except three years in 
the army as a private and his employment for three 
three years as caretaker at the duck club at which he 
works three months a year (R. 66-67, 245-248). 
In the conversations he told Mrs. Olson that he did 
not believe in providing for the child's future secur-
ity ( R. 325). He stated that he actively assisted 
Susan and the child in leaving with Sharp and that 
he did not thereafter support the child (R. 57-58, 
68). He .stated that 'he was still in love with Susan, 
even though he had since married Lee Deffebach 
( R. 61-62, 83), and suggested that, if the child were 
returned to him, he and Susan would be reunited. 
He did not explain what he intended to do with Lee 
Deffe!bach, whom he had in the meantime married, 
or what should be done 'vith Sharp, to whom Susan 
had become married, and Susan's and Sharp's child 
( R. 65-66) . Bailey stated that he would not volun-
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tarily consent to the adoption of the. child, but that 
he would not resist any legal proceedings ( R. 62, 
81). 
\The child had been placed in a foster home 
fifteen months prior to this time. The foster home 
parents, with whom the child has over the period 
established mutual ties of love and affection and 
whose financial, moral and other qualifications are 
without question, had applied to the Children's Serv-
ice Society for adoption of the child. The Children's 
'Service Society has approved the foster home parents 
as adoptive applicants for the child. It has not, 
of course, given final approva11 for adoption of the 
child by them. (R. 327-330, 334, 349-350.) 
On April 30, 1957, a petition was filed in the 
Juvenile Court of Salt Lake County for the purpose 
of determining Bailey's rights, if any, in the child 
as its natural father, terminating all parental rights 
of J. Gordon Bailey on grounds of neglect and ob-
taining authorization for the Children's Service So-
ciety to place the child for adoption. The petition 
alleged as grounds of neglect the following: that 
J. Gordon Bailey had abandoned the child; that the 
child lacked proper parental care by reason of the 
fault, habits and immoral conduct of J. Gordon 
Bailey; that Bailey had neglected and failed to pro-
vide the child with subsistence, medical and other 
care necessary to the child's health, morals and well-
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being; that the child was in a ·dangerous situation 
to its health and morals by reason of the conduct of 
J. Gordon Bailey. (R. 10.) Summons and notice 
expressly stating that the hearing was for the pur-
pose of permanently depriving Bailey of his rights, 
if any, in the child and for the purpose of granting 
custody of the child to the Children's Service So-
ciety of Utah with authorization to place the child 
for adoption was served on Bailey twelve days prior 
to the date of the hearing (R. 17). Extensive hear-
ings were held in the matter on May 14, May 16, and 
May 24, 1957, (R. 1-2). On June 10, 1957, the juv-
enile court entered its findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and decree in the matter. It expressly found 
the child to be a neglected child, J. Gordon Bailey 
to be an unfit and improper person to have its cus-
tody. and control and that the best interest of the 
child required that its custody be taken from J. 
Gordon Bailey because of his fault, habits and man-
ner of living. The court by its decree terminated 
all parental rights of J. Gordon Bailey and granted 
cus~tody of the child to the Children's Service Society 
of Utah with authorization to place the child for 
adoption and authority to complete adoption of the 
child by the prospective adopting parents. (R. 22-
25.) The court, in finding the child to be a neg-
lected c'hild, expressly found facts showing the fol-
lowing. (1) That Bailey had abandoned and know-
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ingly neglected the child in that he had voluntarily 
assisted Susan and t~e child in leaving with Sharp 
because he .no longer wanted -responsibility for the 
child and that he did not thereafter contribute to 
the sup·port of the child, although he knew of the 
whereabouts of the child or facts from which he 
could have ascertained its whereabouts from the 
approximate time that Susan and the child separ-
ated from him on October 30, 195'5, to February of 
1956, and that thereafter he did not make any effort 
to determine the whereabouts of the child and did 
not contribute to its support. (2) That Bailey know-
ingly and intentionally failed to provide the child 
with subsistence, medical and other care necessary 
to the child's health, morals and well-being in that 
Bailey knowingly and intentionally failed to pro-
vide necessary medical and other care for the child 
during the pregnancy, birth and post confinement 
and during prolonged periods that the child suffered 
from diarrhea accompanied by fever, jaundice and 
bronchial difficulty thereafter. ( 3) That the child 
lacked proper parental care and was in a situation 
dangerous to its health and morals by reason of the 
fault, habits, conduct and manner of living of J. 
Gordon Bailey. (R. 22-25.) 
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ARGUMENT 
POIN'T I. 
THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE AND AD-
MITTED FACTS C·ONCLUSIVELY SHOW THE CHILD 
TO BE A NEGLE·C'TED CHILD AND APPELLANT TO 
BE AN UNFIT AND IMPROPER PERSON 'TO HAVE 
ITS CUSTODY WITHIN THE MEANING OF SE·CTIONS 
55-10-6 AND 55-10-32, U.C.A., 1953. 
Section 55-10-6, U.C.A., 1953, defines the words 
"neglected child" to include the following: 
"A child who is abandoned by his par-
ent, * * *. 
'' A child who lacks proper parental care 
by reason of the fault or habits of the parent, 
* * * 
"A child whose parent * * * neglects 
or refuses to provide proper or necessary 
subsistence, education, medical or surgical 
care or othe·r care necessary for his health, 
morals or well-being. 
* * * 
"A child * * * who associates with va-
grant, vic'ious or immoral persons. 
"A child who * * * is in a situation * * * 
injurious to the health or morals of himself 
or others." 
Section 55-10-32, U.C.A., 1953, provides as. 
follows: 
"No child * * * shall ·be taken from the 
custody of its parents * * * unless the court 
shall find from the evidence introduced in 
the ·case that such parent * * * has knowing-
32 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ly failed and neglected to provide for such 
child the proper maintenance, care, training 
and education ·contemplated and required by 
both law and morals * * * or unless the court 
shall find from all the circumstances in the 
case that * * * the welfare of a child requires 
that his custody be taken from its parents 
* * * " . 
( 1) !The uncontroverted evidence shows the 
following. That Bailey persistently indulged in sodo-
mous and homosexual relationships, is gui'lty of gen-
eral sexual depravity and that this conduct was 
visited on three children, ages 12, 13 and 15 respec-
tively, and on the child that is rthe subject of this 
proceeding during the period that it was living with 
Bailey. That Bailey lived openly in what, so far as 
he knew, was an aduTterous and in an illicit rela-
tionship with Susan and as a result this child was 
born. Tha;t eight months after the relationship with 
Susan was terminated, Bailey openly entered into 
an adulterous and illegal relationship with Lee Def-
febach. Bailey did not deny the sodomous and homo-
sexual relationships and the general sexual depravity 
and offered no evidence that his traits in these res-
pects have changed. Bailey did not deny the 'illicit 
and adulterous relationships and offered as his only 
excuse that he did so, in the case of one woman, be-
cause of her insistence, and, in the case of the other, 
'because he "considered it very important to her 
hea1th" that he do so. Wherther or not these women 
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consented to live with Bailey in these relationships 
is immaterial to the proceeding before this court, 
except to the extent that it shows Bailey's lac'k of 
character as a proper custodian for this child by 
virtue of his association with them. Susan's testi-
mony that Bailey openly rejected marriage as an 
insrtitution 'because he believed that people should 
be free to ·come and go promiscuously according to 
their desires and to the effect that he persistently 
refused to marry her, in spite of her pleadings for 
the legitimacy of the child, is corroborated by four 
witnesses ( R. 75-76, 50, 180-183, 279-280). It is 
submitted that by virtue of the foregoing the child 
is a neglected chi'ld within the meaning of the second, 
third, fourth and fifth paragraphs above quoted 
from ·Section 55-10-6, U.C.A., 1953, in that (1) 
the child lacks proper parental care by reason of the 
fault and habits of J. Gordon Bailey, (2) J. Gordon 
Bailey has neglected and refused to provide the 
child with care necessary to tl1e child's health, mor-
als and well-being, (3) the child, to the extent that 
Bailey claims any interest in it as its natural father, 
is, within the literal wording of the statute, asso-
ciated with a vagrant, vicious and immoral person 
and ( 4) is in a situation dangerous and injurious 
to the child's health and morals. 
IThat evidence of illicit relationships and im-
moral habits and conduct, coupled with neglect and 
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failure to provide a child with proper subsistence, 
medical and other care for 1the child's health, morals 
and well-being, does support a finding that the child 
is a neglected child and that the parent is unfit to 
have its custody, within the meaning of Sections 
55-10-6 and 55-10-32, U.C.A., 195'3, see, In re Br~ad­
ley (1946) 109 U. 538, 167 P.2d 9'78, and, In re Olson 
(1947) 111 U. 365, 180 .P.2d. 210. That open profes-
sion of belief in illegal and adulterous relationships 
and exposure of a child to such relationships does 
constitute the child a neglected child and the parent 
unfit, see, In re State in Interest of BZack (1955) 
3 U.2d 315, 283 P.2d 88'7. That exposure of a chi1d 
to brutal and sadistic treatment does constitute the 
child a neglected child and support a finding that 
the parent is unfit, see, In re Miller (19'52) 40 
Wash.2d 319, 24·2 P.2d 1016. 
(2) The admitted facts show the following. 
That Bailey knowingly and intentionally neglected 
to provide the child with proper and necessary medi-
cal care during the period of conception, at birth 
and thereafter down to the date of the hearing in 
this matter. Bailey's only excuse was that he claim-
ed that Susan consented to this course of conduct 
during the period that she lived with him. Susan's 
positiv~ testimony to the effect that she requested 
necessary medical care during the period of concep-
tion and at birth and during the periods of prolonged 
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and serious illness of the child thereafter and as to 
Bailey's diabolical reasons for refusing such care ,, 
is corroborated by the testimony of three witnesses 
(R. 38-40, 39-43, 72-7'5, 45-46, 49). Again, whether 
or not Susan consented to this course of conduct is 
not material to this proceeding except to the extent 
that it shows Bailey's lack of character as a fit cus-
todian for this ·child by virtue of his association with 
her. Furthermore, Susan's testimony as to Bailey's 
personal conduct in wilfully exposing the child to 
dangers of disease, iTlness and death during the peri-
od of conception, at birth and thereafter, of itself, 
supports a finding that the child is a neglected child. 
Bailey's only excuse for failing to provide medical 
care for the child after his illicit relationship with 
Susan and the child was terminated and down to 
the date of the hearing in this matter was that he 
did not know the whereabouts of the child. The posi-
tive evidence shows that Bailey knew the_ where-
abouts of the child during the first four months 
after Susan and the child left with his assistance 
and that, thereafter, Bailey did not inquire as to the 
child's whereabouts or welfare. It is submitted that 
the admitted facts as to failure to provide this child 
with proper and necessary medical care constitute 
the c·hild a neglected child within the meaning of 
the third paragraph of Section 55-10-6, U.C.A., 
1953, a'bove set forth. 
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T·hat failure to provide a child with proper and 
necessary medical care, coupled with other evidence 
of irresponsible conduct, does sup·port a finding that 
the child is a neglected child within the meaning of 
Sections 55-10-6 and 55-10-32, U.C.A., 1953, see, 
In re Br~adley (1946) 109 U. 5'38, 16'7 P.2d 978, 
in which the evidence of medical neglect did not ap-
proach the flagrance of tha;t in the case before this 
court. 
(3) The uncontroverted evidence and admit-
ted facts show the following. Bailey actively assisted 
Susan and the ·child in terminating the illicit rela-
tionship with Bailey and leaving with S·harp. For 
a period of four months thereafter Bailey knew of 
the whereabouts of the child or of facts from which 
he could have ascertained its whereabouts. Bailey 
did not during the period contribute in any manner 
to :the care and support of the child. At the expira-
tion of this four month period Bailey wrote a letter 
to Susan in which he requested resumption of Bail-
ey's and Susan's relationship, even though in the 
meantime Susan had married Sharp. Sharp in Feb-
ruary of 195'6 responded to the letter and told Bailey 
to quit bothering them. Thereafter Bailey made no 
inquiries concerning the child or its whereabouts 
and welfare and did not provide for its care and 
support down to the time of the hearing in this mat-
ter. Bailey told Mrs. Alice Olson, case worker for 
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the Children's Service Society of Utah, in a con-
versation three weeks prior to the date of hearing 
that he had not contributed to the support of the 
child since ·susan and the child left with S'harp be-
cause he knew Sharp had $800.00 at the time, was 
employed and was able to care for the child (R. 
57-58) . Bailey told Sharp's sister that he consented 
that Susan leave with Sharp because Sharp was in 
a !better position to care for the child than Bailey 
( R. 168-169) . It is submitted that the foregoing 
constitutes the child a neglected child within the 
meaning of the third paragraph of Section 55-10-6, 
U.C.A., 1953, a'bove quoted to the effect that a neg-
lected child includes, ''A child whose parent * * * 
neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary 
subsisten·ce, education, medical or surgical care or 
other care necessary for his health, morals or well-
being." See, In re Bradley (1946) 109 U. S38, 167 
P.2d 978, and In re Olson (194'7) 111 U. 365, 180 
P. 2d 210, so holding. In the Bradley case the mother 
left the child with the mother's aunt for a period of 
four months without providing care and support or 
arranging for such care and support. In the Olson 
case the father permitted the child to remain with 
its maternal grandparents and aunt and did not 
provide ·care because he believed the grandparents 
were providing adequate care and did not provide 
financial suppo]}t because the grandparents did not 
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request it. In both cases the court held the children 
involved to be neglected children within the meaning 
of Sections 55-10-6 and 55-10-32, U.C.A., 1953. It 
is no answer that Bailey left the child in the care of 
its mother, Susan. Bailey was his father. As such, 
to the extent that Bailey claims any interest in the 
child born of an illegitimate relationship, he had 
an independent duty to provide parental care and 
support. Instead he actively assisted Susan and the 
child in leaving with Sharp and thereafter know-
ingly and intentionally neglected to provide sub-
sis~tence and ,care for the child. 
( 4) The evidence further shows the following. 
Both before and after birth of the child :susan plead-
ed with Bailey to marry her for the purpose of 
legitimating the child. Bailey persistently refused 
and openly rejected marriage as an insti:tution be-
cause he !believed that people should be free to live 
in promiscuity according to their desires and because 
"no child is illegitimate before God". Susan's posi-
tive testimony to this effect is corroborated by four 
witnesses (R. 40-41, 50, 75-76, 180-183, 337-3'38). 
Bailey affirmatively suggested that Susan leave him 
and go and live with Sharp. Bailey told Sharp 
that Bailey's principal objective was to dump 'Susan 
and the child because he did not want the responsi-
lbility. Bailey affirmatively suggested that Susan 
and ·sharp take the child with them and actively as-
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sisted them and the child in departing. For a period 
of four months thereafter Bailey knew the where-
abouts of the child and did not contribute to its 
support. Thereafter Bailey did not inquire concern-
ing the whereabouts of the child or its welfare and 
did not contribute to its support down to the time 
of the hearing. It is submitted that the foregoing 
evidence supports a finding tha:t the child, born out 
of wedlock, was abandoned by its natural father 
within the meaning of the first paragraph of 'Section 
55-10-6, U.C.A., 1953, which defines a neglected 
child to include, ''A child who is abandoned by his 
parent * * * .'' Although the meaning of the word 
"abandoned" as used in Section 55-10-6, U.C.A., 
1953, has not been defined by this court, there is 
no question that under admitted facts of this case 
the child is a neglected ch:lld within the meaning of 
·both 'Sections 1515-10-6 and 55-10-32. See, In re Brad-
ley (1946) 109 U. 538, 16'7 P.2d 978, at page 983. 
( 5) Appellant asserts that ~by reason of the 
fact that the evidence shows that the child was in 
the care of a third party, to-wit, the Children's 
Service Society of Utah from and after February 
9, 1956, down to the date of the hearing in this 
matter and by reason of the fact that appellant did 
not know the actual physical location of the child 
during this period, 'the child could not have been a 
neglected child on the date of the hearing. (Appel-
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lant's brief, pp. 7-9, 21-22, 31-32, 44-45.) 'The evi-
dence conclusively shows the following. That appel-
lant actively assisted 'Susan and the child in leaving 
with Sharp on October 30, 1955. That appellant 
did not thereafter support the child because appel-
lant thought that Sharp was in a !better position 
than appellant to do so. 'That appellant knew the 
whereabouts of the ·child or facts from which he 
could have ascertained its whereabouts for a period 
of four months after Susan and the child left with 
Sharp down to February of 1956 and that, upon re-
ceipt of a letter from Sharp in February of 1956 
teTlirig appellant to quit bothering 'Susan and Sharp, 
appellant did not thereafter inquire concerning the 
welfare and whereabouts of the child and did not 
contribute to its support. That such conduct does 
constitute present neglect of the child, see, In re 
Bradley (1946) 109 U. 538, 167 P.2d 978, and In 
re Olson (1947) 111 U. 365, 180 P.2d 210. In the 
Olson case the fa:ther claimed that because the child 
was receiving adequate care and support from its 
grandparents at the time of the hearing, the child 
was not then a neglected child. The court said at 180 
P.2d pp. 213-214: 
'''The contention t h a t the petition 
fails to state facts sufficient to show neglect 
on the part of appellant to support his minor 
child, assumes that there are aTlegations 
which negative parental neglect by showing 
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that the child has been and is now being well 
cared for by the grandfather and maternal 
aunt. The petition states that since 1938 ap-
pellant as father of Judith has failed to pro-
vide support or training for her, and that 
her grandparents have been caring for her. 
* * * An allegation that other relatives or 
friends provide care for a child neglected by 
a parent, does not negative the averment that 
a parent has neglected his parental respon-
sibilities. 
''By specifying that the words 'neglected 
child' include a child 'whose parent, guardian 
or custodian neglects or refuses to provide 
proper or necessary subsistence, education, 
medical or surgical care or other care neces-
sary for his health, morals or well-being' the 
statttte seeks to reach the person who is pri-
marily responsible for the care and support 
of the child. The fact that some third person 
may be providing care for a child by reason 
of neglect of the parent to do so, does not de-
prive the juvenile court of jurisdiction to in-
quire into the welfare of such child and to 
fix responsibility and determine custody for 
the child within the scope of the statutory 
authority granted to the court." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Appellant asserts that evidence of appellant's 
past immorality and misconduct during all periods 
that the child was with appellant and for prolonged 
periods thereafter does not constitute evidence that 
the child was a neglected child and appellant an un-
fit and improper person to have its custody at the 
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time of the hearing. (Appellant's brief, pp. 21-22, 
31-32, 44-45.) The evidence as to appellant's im-
morality and misconduct showed that it persisted 
during all periods that the child was with appellant 
and for prolonged periods both before and after that 
time. It was positive, direct and uncontroverted. 
Appellant did not deny it and offered no evidence 
that his traits in this respect had changed at the 
time of trial. 
Appellant cites In re State in Interest of John-
son (1946) 110 U. 500, 175 P.2d 486, and In re 
Miller (19'52) 40 Wash.2d 319, 242 P.2d 1016, as 
authority for the proposition that evidence of prior 
immorality and misconduct on the part of a parent 
will not support a finding that the child is a present-
ly neglected child and that the parent is an unfit 
and improper person to have the custody of the child 
at the time of the hearing. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
20-2:2, 44-45.) In the Johnson case it was alleged 
in the petition that the parent, in the future, would 
be unable to provide support and care for the child. 
The supreme court held that an allegation that the 
mother in the future would be unable to support 
and care for the child did not constitute an allega-
tion of the present status of the c;hild as a dependent 
child within the meaning of Section 55-10-6, U.C.A., 
1953. The court in so holding said that, if the peti-
tion had alleged that prior to the filing of the petition 
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the mother had not properly supported the child, 
the allegation would have been sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction on the juvenile court on ground of pre-
sent dependency within the meaning of the statute. 
IThe court said at 175 P.2d p. 489: 
"The petition does not allege that Billy 
was homeless or destitute or without proper 
support or care through no fault of his parent. 
All it says along this line is that the 
mother is financially unable to provide a fit 
and proper home for said child. This is not 
an alleg~ation of the present status of the child, 
but is ~an attack on the ability of the mother 
in the future to look after him. For all that 
the petition alleges we do not know but that, 
up to the time of the filing of the petition, the 
mother had properly supported the baby." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the Miller case the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington affirmed the juvenile court in permanently 
depriving the father of his rights in the child be-
cause the father had previously treated the child 
in a brutal and sadistic manner. That evidence 
of past immorality, misconduct and irresponsibility 
on the part of a parent is admissible on the issue of, 
and will support a finding of, present neglect of a 
child and unfitness of a parent to have its custody, 
see also, In re Bradley (1946) 109 U. 538, 167 P.2d 
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POIN'T II. 
THE ORDER PERMANENTLY DEPRIVING AP-
PELLANT OF CUS'TODY OF THE C;HILD AND AU'TH-
ORIZING PLACEMENT OF THE CHILD FOR ADOP-
TION IS SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS. THE 
JUVENILE COUR'T FOUND THE CHILD 'TO BE A 
NEGLECTED CHILD WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
SECTIONS 55-10-6 AND 55-10-32, U.C.A., 1953, AND 
THAT THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD REQUIRED 
THAT HIS CUS'TODY BE TAKEN FROM APPELLANT. 
Section 55-10-3'2, U.C.A., 1953, so far as ma-
terial to the point under consideration, provides the 
following: 
''No child * * * shall be taken from the 
custody of its parents * * * unless the court 
shall find from the evidence introduced in the 
case that such parent * * * ( 1) has knowing-
ly failed and neglected to provide for such 
child the proper maintenance, care, training 
and education contemplated and required by 
both law and morals * * * or unless the court 
shall find from all the circumstances in the 
case that * * * (2) the welfare of the child 
requires that his custody be taken from its 
parents * * * .'' 
Appellant asserts that because the juvenile 
court did not insert the word "knowingly" in its 
findings of fact showing that appellant, not only 
knowingly but intentionally, failed and neglected 
to provide for the child proper maintenance, care, 
training and education contemplated and required 
by both law and morals, and because the juvenile 
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court did not insert the word "welfare" in its ex-
press finding that the best interest of the child re-
quired that his custody be taken from appellant 
that, therefore, the findings do not meet the require-
ments of Section 55-10-32, U.C.A., 1953, and do not, 
therefore, support the judgment of the court per-
manently depriving appellant of custody of the 
child and authorizing placement of the child for 
adoption. (Appellant's brief, pp. 39-42.) 
The juvenile court expressly found facts show-
ing the following. ( 1) That appellant abandoned 
and knowingly neglected the child in that he volun-
tarily assisted Susan and the child in leaving with 
Sharp and that he did not thereafter contribute to 
the support of the child although he knew of the 
whereabouts of the child or facts from which he could 
have ascertained its whereabouts from the approxi-
mate time that Susan and the child separated from 
him on October 30, 1955, to February of 1956, and 
that thereafter he did not make any effort to de-
termine the whereabouts of the child and did not 
contribute to its support. (2) That appellant know-
ingly and intentionally failed to provide the child 
with subsistence, medical and other care necessary 
to the child's health, morals and well-being in that 
appellant knowingly neglected to provide for the 
child as in ( 1) above set forth and in that appellant 
knowingly and intentionally failed to provide neces-
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sary medical and other care -for the child during 
the pregnancy, birth and post confinement and dur-
ing prolonged periods that the child suffered from 
diarrhea accompanied by fever, jaundice and bron-
chial difficulty thereafter. (3) That the ·child lacked 
proper parental care and was in a situation dan-
gerous to its health and morals by reason of the 
fault, habits, conduct and manner of living of ap-
pellant. 'The juvenile court also expressly found 
the following ultimate facts. ( 4) That the custody 
of the child should be taken from appellant because 
of his fau'rt, habits and manner of living and ( 5) 
that the best interest of the child required that 
appellant be deprived of his custody. The latter two 
findings were s.et forth in the court's conclusions of 
law. 
IThat a finding of ultimate fact set forth by 
the court 'in its conclusions of law has the legal effect 
of a finding of fact, see, Consolidated W~agon & 
Machine Co. v. ~ay (1933) 81 U. 595, 2'21 P.2d 
836.- That the failure of the court to insert the word 
"knowingly" in its findings of fact showing that 
appellant knowingly and intentionally failed and 
neglected to provide the child with proper mainten-
ance and care contemplated and required by both 
law and morals and that the failure of the court 
to insert the words ''welfare of the child" in its 
express finding that the custody of the child should 
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be taken from appellant because of appellant's fault, 
habits and manner of living and in its express find-
ing and that the best interest of the child required 
that appellant be deprived of the child's custody, was 
not error and did not invalidate the findings, see, 
In re Miller- (1952) 40 ¥/ash.2d 319, 24'2 P.2d 1016. 
In the Miller case the Washington statute defined a 
dependent child as a child, "whose home, by reason 
of neglect, cruelty or depravity of its parents or 
either of them is an unfit place for such child * * *." 
The juvenile court found the children were depen-
dent ,children in that the father was a brutal and 
sadistic person and in that he was not a fit and pro-
per person to have the care and custody of the child-
ren. The father appealed from the judgment of the 
juvenile court permanently depriving him of custody 
of the children and claimed that the judgment was 
not supported by the findings because the court did 
not insert in the findings an express provision to 
the effect that the children's "home was an unfit 
place for such children." The Supreme Court of 
Washington affirmed the judgment of the juvenile 
court permanently depriving the father of custody of 
the children and held that, although the statute de-
fining a dependent child required the juvenile court 
to find that the "home of the child was unfit", it 
was not necessary that the juvenile court insert the 
express words, "that the home was unfit" in its 
findings. The court said at 242 P.2d p. 1018: 
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"While the juvenile court did not, in the 
above quoted findings, sp.ecifically state that 
the home w~as an unfit place for these child-
ren, we think that is to be inferred from the 
findings relative to the unfitness of the fa-
ther and mother to have the custody of their 
children." (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant asserts that because the juvenile 
court found that the mother of the child testified 
to certain facts as to appellant's immorality, in-
tentional neglect of the child and misconduct (which 
~t stimony wqs no1t co[1ntrodverted) the cou.rt did not, .. _, @Re-lo~ee. ..p,ncJ "i:n e.. •JI ~~ be. II- ~eqle~'l-~d- qk, Ia. ,(.A ~ QxpressJy :tg~,__n faets Sfl07VVIHg 'that tne ehtld 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 22-26, 46-48.) 'The juvenile 
court expressly found facts showing that the child 
was a neglected child by reason of the fault, habits 
and misconduct of appellant and by reason of ap-
pellant's abandonment of the child and by reason 
of appellant's intentional neglect to provide the 
child with proper and necessary maintenance and 
care contemplated 'by both law and morals. The fact 
that the juvenile court further found that the mother 
of the child testified (which testimony was uncon-
tradicted) to certain additional facts as to appe'l-
llant's immorality, intentional neglect of the child 
and misconduct does not mean that the juvenile 
court failed to find the child to be a neglected child. 
We concede that the findings, made and entered by 
the juvenile court, were not artfully drawn. That 
this does not result in reversible error, see, In re 
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Clift's Estate (1927) 70 U. 409, 260 P. 859, 867, 
where the court said : 
"Other errors of a technical nature are 
assigned as to the findings. While some of 
the findings are not in artistic form accord-
ing to approved models, neverthless, they in-
dicate clearly the mind of the court. Such as-
signments are therefore without merit." 
Furthermore, if it were assumed for purposes 
of argument only that the juvenile court's findings 
were defective, the error could not have prejudiced 
appellant because the uncontroverted evidence and 
admitted facts conclusively show the child to be a 
neglected ehild and appellant to be an unfit and 
improper person to have its custody. That the fail-
ure of a trial court to find against an appellant on 
material issues does not prejudice the appellant and 
is not reversible error, where the uncontroverted 
evidence is against the appellant on those issues, 
see: Parowan Meroantile Vo. v. Gurr (1934) 83 U. 
463, 30 P.2d 207; Piper v. Hatch ( 1935) 86 U. 292, 
43 P.2d 700; In re Miller (1952) 40 Wash.2d 319, 
242 P.2d 1016; and, In re Johns.on (1931) 50 Idaho 
573, '300 P. 492. 
In Parow~an M ercant·ile Co. v. Gurr the appel-
lant claimed that the failure of the trial court to 
find on a material issue, to-wit, whether or not 
there was consideration for the promissory note 
sued on, rendered the judgment void and required 
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reversal by the supreme couflt. The Supreme Court 
of Utah affirmed the trial court and held, that since 
the evidence conelusively showed that there was 
consideration for the note, the failure of the trial 
court to find on that issue could not have prejudiced 
appellant and was not, therefore, reversible error. 
The court said at 30 P.2d p. 210: 
"We have, however, reviewed the plead-
ings and the evidence set forth in the tran-
script. We are satisfied that had the trial court 
made specific findings on all issues, material 
or otherwise, presented by the answer no find-
ing would have been permissible other than 
such as would support the judgment. We are 
therefore of the opinion that the error, if 
any, did not affect any substantial right of 
the defendant." 
In the Miller case the father, on appeal from 
the judgment of the juvenile court permanently de-
priving him of custody of his children, claimed that 
because the findings of the juvenile court were gen-
eral findings to the effect that the father was a 
brutal and sadistic person and not fit to have the 
custody of the children they did not constitute find-
ings of fact and did not, therefore, support an ad-
judication that the children were dependent children. 
'The Supreme Court of Washington held that, since 
the facts as to the misconduct of the appellant were 
not controverted, the appellant was no't prejudiced 
by the omissions in the findings and the case was 
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not, therefore, subject to reversal on that ground. 
The court said at 242 P.2d p. 1018: 
"However, our examination of the rela-
tively short record indicates that the basic 
facts are not in serious dispute. Relators have 
therefore not been prejudiced because of the 
general nature of the findings, and, accord-
ingly, we would not be warranted in revers-
ing on that ground.'' 
POIN'T III. 
'THE JUVENILE COURT FOUND THE CHILD TO 
BE THE LEGITIMA'TE CHILD OF APPELLAN'T BY 
VIRTUE OF PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT PURSU-
ANT TO 'THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 78-30-12, 
U.C.A., 1953. 
Appellant asserts that the juvenile court found 
that the child was the illegitimate child of appel-
lant and that the child was not legitimated by ap-
pellan~t's acknowledgment of the child as his own. 
From this appellant concludes that the juvenile 
court, therefore, treated the case as a habeas corpus 
action and not as an action in the interest of the 
child for the purpose of determining whether the 
child was a neglected child and whether appellant 
was a fit person to have its custody. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 13-19.) 
Both assertions by appellant are incorrect and 
contrary to the record. ( 1) The court expressly 
found in its findings of fact that appellant and the 
child's mother lived openly as man and wife with 
the child at the duck club, which was appellant's 
52 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
home, from the time of birth of the child on January 
7, 1955, to October 30, 1955. The court in its con-
clusions of law expressly adjudicated that the child 
may be considered to be the legitimate child of ap-
pellant because of recognition of said child as his 
son by J. Gordon Bailey. (2) The case was not 
treated as a habeas corpus action. The action was 
'instituted in the juvenile court, entitled ·state of 
Utah in the interest of Karl Bailey, and the entire 
proceeding was conducted for the purpose of de-
termining whether or not the child was a neglected 
child and whether or not appellan1t was a fit and 
proper person to have its custody. 
Furthermore, there is no logical connection be-
tween appellant's unsupported assertion that the 
juvenile court did not find the child 'to have been 
legitimated by appellant's acknowledgment of the 
child and appellant's unsupported conclusion that, 
therefore, the juvenile court treated the case as a 
habeas corpus action and not as a proceeding in the 
interest of the child. 
If it were assumed for purposes of argument 
only that the juvenile Court .did find the child to be 
an illegitimate child and not to have been legitimated 
by appellant's acknowledgment of the child as his 
son, the error could not have prejudiced appellant 
because the uncontroverted evidence and admitted 
facts conclusively show tha:t the child is a neglected 
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child and that appellant is an unfit and improper 
person to have its custody. 
We do not concede, by virtue of the foregoing, 
that the juvenile court was necessarily correct in 
finding that the ·child was the legitimate child of 
appellant by reason of appellant's recognition of 
the child as his son. Section 78-30-12, U.C.A., 1953, 
provides the following: 
"The father of an illegitimate child, by 
publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiv-
ing it as such with the consent of his wife, 
if he is married, into his family, and otherwise 
treating it as if ·it were a legiti'lJUlte child, 
thereby adopts it as such, and such child is 
thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate 
from the time of its bir'th." (Emphasis added.) 
It might well be ·held, as a matter of law, that 
appellant did not "otherwise treat the child as if 
it were a legitimate child'' in view of the fact that 
ap·pellant persistently refused to marry the chi1d's 
mother, while he was living with her as man and 
wife, in spite of her pleading that he do so in order 
to legitimate the child. Susan's tes'timony to this 
effect is corroborated by the physical circumstances 
of a mother of an illegitimate child, the testimony 
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POINT IV. 
THE JUVENILE COUR'T DID NOT ERR IN AD-
MITTING EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE PROSPEC-
TIVE ADIOP'TING pARENTS IN 'THE INTEREST OF 
THE CHILD. 
Appellant asserts that the juvenile court erred 
in admitting evidence concerning the prospective 
adopting parents and in authorizing the Children's 
Service Society to complete adoption of the child 
on the following ground. That the juvenile court is 
a court of limited jurisdiction. That the sole question 
before the ·court was whether the child was a neg-
lected child. IThat the juvenile court is not an adop-
tion court. \T·hat, therefore, admission by the court 
of evidence that some fifteen months prior to the 
hearing the child had been placed in a foster home, 
that natural ties of love and affection had developed 
'between the child and the foster parents, that the 
foster parents had applied for adoption of the child, 
that the Children's Service Society of Utah had ap-
proved the qualifications of the foster parents as 
adoption applicants, and that the foster parents 
were qualified to adopt the child was error, and that 
the juvenile court's finding of the above facts and 
grant of custody to the Children's Service Society 
of Utah with right of adoption placement and with 
authorization to complete adoption of the child by 
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( 1) 'This suggestion ignores the fact that the 
primary purpose of the hearing was the best interest 
and welfare of the child and· that any evidence 
bearing on that issue was admissible under the pro-
visions of Section 55-10-'26, U.C.A., 1953, which 
provisions expressly authorize the juvenile court 
in all cases relating to delinquency, neglect and de-
pendency of children to, "adopt any form of pro-
cedure * * * which !t deems best suited to ascertain 
the facts * * * and to make a disposition in the best 
interests of such children * * * ," and expressly re-
quire the juvenile court to, "inquire into the home 
environment, history, associations and general con-
dition of such children * * * .'' 
( 2) This suggestion further ignores the pro-
visions of Section 55-10-43, U.C.A., 1953, which 
provisions expressly authorize and require children's 
aid societies to report the facts as to adoption place-
ments to the juvenile court and the juvenile court, 
based on the evidence presented, to pass upon the 
qualifications of the adoption applicants and, if it 
deems it advisable, to authorize completion of the 
adoption by the applicants. 
(3)' !The evidence that, during the fifteen 
month period, natural ties of love and affection had 
been established betwee11 the child and the prospec-
tive adopting parents and as to the latters' quali-
fications was further admissi'ble on the following 
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ground. Bailey had actively assisted Susan and the 
child in leaving with Sharp on October 30, 1955, 
under circumstances considerably more flagrant 
than the average abandonment. He had persistently 
refused to honor Susan's pleas that he marry her 
in order to legitimate the child. During the four 
month period thereafter down to February of 1956 
he knew of the child's whereabouts and did not con-
tribute to its support. From February of 1956 down 
to the time of the hearing in this matter he did not 
inquire concerning the welfare of the child or its 
whereabouts and did not support it. In the mean-
time in February of 1956 the Children's Service 
Society placed the child in the home of the foster 
parents, and over 'the fifteen month period natural 
ties of love and affection were established between 
them. The damage to the emotional stability of the 
child that would result from severance of that rela-
tionship would be the direct result of Bailey's mis-
conduct, intentional neglect of the child and irre-
sponsibility. It was clearly within the province of the 
juvenile court to ·hear and consider the evidence in 
the best interest of the child. 
Appellant asserts that the admission of evi-
dence concerning the prospective adopting parents 
and the order of the juvenile court authorizing place-
ment of the child for adoption violated due process 
because appellant did not 'have notice that one of the 
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issues at the hearing would be authorization to place 
the child for adoption. (Appellant's brief, p. 42.) 
Appellant did have notice that the purpose of the 
hearing was the best interest and welfare of the 
child. Furthermore, the summons and ndtice served 
on Bai1ey twelve days prior to the hearing expressly 
stated that the purpose of the ·hearing was to per-
manently deprive J. Gordon Bailey of his parental 
rights, if any, in the child and to grant custody of 
the child to the Children's Service Society of Utah 
with authorization to place the child for adoption. 
(R. 17.) 
Furthermore, if it were assumed for purpose 
of argument only that the juvenile court erred in 
admitting the evidence concerning the prospective 
adopting parents, the error could not have prejudic-
ed appellant because the uncontroverted evidence 
and admitted facts show the child to be a neglected 
child and appellant to be an unfit and improper 
person to have its custody. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McBROOM & HANNI, 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
C·hildren's Service Society of Utah. 
58 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
